agency (or action) as a specific modal or quasi-modal topic, always with that specially honest von Wrightian insistence of the lack of finality of the formulation in question, including attending to non-modal formulations in which complements are taken as terms signifying specific or generic actions, rather than sentences. As in other cases, the work keeps a close eye on deontic logic, to which he contributed so much. Von Wright did not I think succeed in disentangling agency from change, and did not evince interest in the general problem of embedding of agentives. For instance (but only 'for instance'), in his earliest paper von Wright took as a primitive d(plp), to be read as expressing some. such idea as "the agent preserves the state described by p" (pp. 43, 57).8 In contrast with Anderson, however, agency here has been separated out from patiency.
Kanger and Kanger 1966 introduce as a separate locution X causes F, where F is supposed to be a sentence, but in a fashion like Anderson's, they logicize about it only by setting down that F may be replaced by its logical equivalents, and that the proposition that X causes F implies that F. Three influential lines of research began about the same time, each of which highlighted the separate existence of agentive modalities; namely, those initiated by Castafteda, by Kenny, and by Chisholm.9 Castafteda, whose views concerning deontic logic have informed both philosophers and logicians for many years (since at least Castafleda 1954), has much to say that is relevant to agency as a modality. Though his philosophical concerns have led him to pursue goals other than the formulation of a modal logic of agency, he has repeatedly urged the fundamental importance of the grammatical and logical distinction between "propositions" and "practitions" (a distinction put as clearly as anywhere in Castafieda 1981); but because there is no possibility of constructing a Castafieda "practition" from an arbitrary sentence, in the way for instance that Anderson's M(x, p, y) or von Wright's d(p/p) each permit an arbitrary sentence in place of p, Castafteda practitions cannot themselves serve as the foundation for such a modal logic of agency.
8
Von Wright tends to leave to the reader the task of putting bits of logical grammar together with bits of English grammar.
9
Of course other work on the theory of action has also influenced the modal logic of agency, but that literature is unsurveyably vast. I note as a passing example that there is hardly a one of my past or present departmental colleagues who has not contributed.
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Kenny 1963, in the course of initiating a rich literature on the verbal structure of our causal and agentive discourse, says that any "performance" in his technical sense is describable in the form bringing it about that p.
And Chisholm 1964 takes the following as a basic locution on which to found an extensive series of definitions and explanations in the vicinity of agency:
There is a state of affairs A and a state of affairs B, such that he makes B happen with an end to making A happen, where the letters stand in for "propositional clauses," and where the subject of "makes happen" can be either a person or a state of affairs. The discussions of Kenny and Chisholm, though relevant to logical questions, are themselves not directed toward the formulation of either proof-theoretical or semantic principles governing their respective basic locutions.
The above is as accurate a record as I can manage of the early history of the modal logic of agency. If this story is right, then the following is its gist. As for semantics, Chellas takes as a paradigm the technique made famous by Kripke not long before Chellas was writing; I mean deployment of a binary relation between "worlds" in order to clarify modal concepts. Chellas in particular gives a semantic clause for And:
History of the modal logic of agency prior to
Ant is true at the present world just in case 4 is true at all those worlds under the control ofor responsive to the action of-the individual which is the value of r at the present world.
The language that Chellas uses in this pioneering explanation, like the "relative possibility" language of Kripke a few years earlier, is neither familiar in itself nor further clarified by Chellas. Perhaps this is the reason that, like his predecessors, Chellas in practice confines his agentive locution to the imperative context from which his need for it sprung, and does not pause to investigate its separate properties.
After Chellas there is a substantial group of logicians all of whom have deployed a binary relation or a pair of binary relations in an effort to generate a semantic understanding of an agentive modality that might be used as the complement of an imperative or of a deontic operator; I know of Porn 1970 Porn , 1971 Porn , 1974 Porn , 1977 My point is certainly not that Prnn 1977 is less clear than it can be; quite the contrary, it seems to me to offer the best explanations of and the most detailed working out of the modal logic of agency as based on binary rela-tional semantics. The proper conclusion is rather that one should doubt the likelihood that the semantics themselves can serve in the way that was hoped. Aqvist 1974 Aqvist , 1978 provide a much more intuitive semantic setting; these papers are the first of which I know that make the fundamental suggestion that agency is illuminated by seeing it in terms of a tree structure such as is familiar from the extensive form of a game as described in von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944. Aqvist's account of agency is in some respects akin to that described below, in some respects less flexible, and in some respects richer. His aim is not strictly to provide a modal logic of agency; for example, the primitive of Aqvist 1978 is "DO(a, Pa)," to be read "a does, or acts, in such a way that he Ps," and where "Pa" must be an atomic sentence (rather than an arbitrary sentence), and like von Wright, Aqvist wraps agency together with change. But his goal is close enough to warrant (1) a comparison (which is not attempted here) and (2) a suggestion that the reader consult these sources. A notable relevant paper is Mullock 1988. Of decisive importance is the uncommonly rich joint work Aqvist and Mullock 1989, which applies insights derived from the tree structure to serious questions in the law. This book, like that of Hamblin, mentioned below, is required reading.
There is one later commentator on the tradition just described who is of special excellence and interest: Makinson 1986.
In a series of more than a dozen papers beginning with Segerberg 1980, and including among others Segerberg 1981 Segerberg , 1982 Segerberg , 1984 Segerberg , 1985 Segerberg , 1985a Segerberg , 1987 Segerberg , 1988 Segerberg , 1988a , and 1989, a distinguished modal logician develops a richly motivated and intuitively based formal approach to action by taking a routine as the guiding concept. Segerberg explicitly bases some of the intuitive and formal aspects of his work on studies that in computer science have come to be called "dynamic logic," the influence on Segerberg being primarily through Pratt. Consult Elgesem 1989 for a sympathetic yet critical penetrating account of Segerberg's line of research. The work is not fully in the modal logic of agency, since it stresses a grammar of (1) terms (including complex terms) for naming "actions" and (2) predicates for expressing properties of "actions," and thus self-consciously avoids a grammar of nesting connectives. But instead of a complaint this is intended only as a reason for limiting myself to a mere mention of what may indeed turn out to be not only valuable in itself but a useful link between the ontological and modal points of view on agency.
Mention of Pratt calls attention to the existence of a large and interesting formal literature that I fail to cite as part of this mini-history except in so far as it has influenced Segerberg, namely the work on "dynamic logic" and its cousins that has been done by Floyd, Hoare, Pratt, and other computer scientists (see Segerberg 1989 for brief entree via Pratt that is written espe-cially with the logic of action in view, and see Pratt 1980 for an excellent fuller account). There are three reasons for excluding this line of investigation from the present survey: (1) I am very far from familiar with the literature, so that making it accessible is best left to someone else. Further, what I know of it (2) stresses the ontological rather than the modal approach, whereas the latter is the topic of this mini-history, and (3) what I know of it is relevant to action only in the wide sense of "action" that encompasses mechanical action, i.e., the sense of "action" that encompasses the action of programs and starter motors. In fact the present modal point of view makes it arguable that this literature is no more relevant to agency than is the literature of any other discipline that gives us ways to fill out the sentential complement of "sees to it that": an agent can see to it that the starter engages and passes through various stages, or that a certain recursive program runs, or .... But it seems best to make explicit my failure to more than barely mention such a large literature just because so many persons think that although it may be arguable, it certainly isn't plausible that it has no special relevance to agency.ll Penultimately there is von Kutschera 1986, which articulates in one form or another nearly all of the essential underlying ideas concerning agency on which we base the semantics offered below.'2 Finally there is Hamblin 1987, which in the context of a study of imperatives provides a rich source of formal, informal, and semi-formal ideas on the topic at hand, many of which have influenced the present work; in particular, collegial reflection on Hamblin's "action-state semantics" was the immediate context of the beginning of the research reported in the rest of this paper. My own recommendation is that no one ought to try to move deeply into any part of the theory of agency without reading this important book.
Who wants a logic of stit (sees to it that)?
All that work on the modal logic of agency may seem too abstract. Put it this way: who cares about sees to it that as over against vigorous verbs such as butters? The stakes are considerably upped, however, if you agree to the following claims, all of which have been argued by Belnap and Perloff 1988. On the other hand, I once asked a well-known computer scientist/mathematician after a lecture on parallel processing if he had meant his use of "actor" and "agent" to be anything but an idle metaphor, he was aghast that I should need to inquire.
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At the very least, von Kutschera 1986 is to be credited with the No Choice between Undivided Histories condition, with generalization beyond the discrete, with generalization to multiple independent agents (including the Something Happens condition), with attention to strategies, and with semantics for the "deliberative slit" mentioned below in note 17. It also needs to be remarked that von Kutschera 1986 cites the earlier von Kutschera 1980.
NIL BELNAP
In order to state them conveniently, let us agree to use stit as an abbreviation for sees to it that. The first claim is
The Stit Complement Thesis. [a slit: Q] is grammatical and meaningful (though perhaps silly) for an arbitrary sentence Q.
The tradition of agentive modal logic described above has done very little in the way of exploiting this thesis, which implies that we ought to look for ways of finding sentential complements for stit. In particular, the complement might itself either be agentive or not. There is "Ophelia saw to it that she got herself to a nunnery" (in which the complement is itself an agentive) and there is "Ophelia saw to it that she had flowers in her hair" (in which it is not).
The second claim needs statement but surely neither argument nor illustration: * Miscellaneous other constructions such as those involving requests, invitations, demands, plans, intentions, promises, commitments to do, and lots more, must take agentives as their complements.
It is the combination of these claims that exhibits the potential power of the modal logic of agency, or, as we might as well begin to call it, the logic of stit, for the following is an easy consequence of the Restricted Complement Thesis together with the Stit Paraphrase Thesis.
The Stit Normal Form Thesis. In the study of all of those concepts represented by constructions that take agentives as complements, nothing except confusion is lost if the complements are taken to be all and only stit sentences.
For example, if your theory of obligation addresses every case of obligated to see to it that, then your theory will be complete. And if your theory of the obligation construction ever lets it take as complement a sentence that cannot be paraphrased via stit, then your theory will be wrong. (In the sequel I will sometimes say that the constructions requiring agentives must take stit sentences, meaning thereby only that they must take sentences that are paraphrasable as stit sentences.) Given these theses, the desire for a logic of stit now begins to fall into place. Let me illustrate by telegraphing just a few examples.'4 1. Deontic logicians ask if obligation is closed under conjunction. But that is at least superficially an ill-formed question, since the complement of an obligation must (according to thc Stit Normal Form Thesis) be a stit sentence. In seeking a replacement question, we must look to the logic of stit to tell us whether or not a conjunction of stit sentences is itself equivalent to a stit sentence, and if so, to which one. For example, the stit normal form guides us to differentiate the following questions. saw to it that his children were educated, does it follow that a could have seen to it that he did not see to it that his children were educated? Conclusion: if a well-based logic of stit can answer these questions in a satisfying way, then it has a good deal to offer.
Semantics for stit
Let us approach the logic of stit semantically, and somewhat indirectly, by going after the idea that could be expressed by saying the present fact that Q is guaranteed by a prior choice of a.
The displayed expression itself is not suggested as an adequate analysis of stit, which it obviously is not, but instead as a useful approximation. The strategy is to quantify out the prior choice, thereby leaving out any trace of
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an intentional relation between a and the fact that Q itself, and even leaving open the existence or nature of an intentional element in the prior choice. The strategy of approximation is successful to the extent that the resulting structure attributed to stit helps us when we are confused; as Braithewaite says, "no calculus without calculation."
We moment, and that each two moments are "historically connected" via a common earlier moment (but do not suppose that there is a latest such).'6 Letting imo be the instant determined by mo, we may think of its members as alternate ways of "filling" the same instant of time as is "filled" by mo. We say that two histories are undivided at a moment, mo, if at mo they appear as if they were a single line. That is, not only must they pass through mo, but they must also share some later moment. Example: in Figure 1 , histories h, and h2 are undivided at moment mo, but histories h, and h3 are not undivided at moment mo. I have announced that the current approximation to stit is to be based on the choices of agents; and since one cannot get something for nothing, the branching-time backdrop must be supplemented with agents and their choices, to be placed centerstage.
We postulate that the concept of agent is absolute in the sense of Bressan 1972 (or better, a substance sort in the sense of Gupta 1980), which in particular means that there is no fission and no fusion of agents.
As for choice, we idealize by postulating that at each moment, wo, there is defined for each agent a (possibly one-member) choice set, that is, a partition of all of the histories passing through wo. A member of a choice set is called a possible choice, so that a possible choice is a set of histories. If there is only one possible choice for ax at wo, it will be the set of all histories passing through wo. This is a metaphysical postulate, but it is not wild-eyed, and that for two reasons. The first reason is that it is subject to two sane conditions. The first condition, due to P. Kremer, is the No Choice between Undivided Histories condition: a choice set for an agent at wo must keep together histories that are undivided at wo; i.e., no agent can make a choice that includes one of two undivided histories but excludes the other. The second condition, the Something Happens condition, only comes into play when considering multiple agents: for each way of selecting one possible choice for each agent from among his or her choice set, the intersection of all the possible choices selected must contain at least one history; i.e., something happens. The second reason that our metaphysics of choices is not crazy is that it explicitly allows that the choice set for an agent at a moment might be vacuous, containing but a single option, namely, the set of all histories passing through that moment. Perhaps this is the situation that most of us are in most of the time, and it certainly describes our state when asleep.
16
The idea is that each history is isomorphic to each other under the one-one correspondence provided by the partition into instants. Two further remarks: although we do postulate "historical connection," we do not here rely on this postulation; and although we fail to postulate that the tree of moments is a lower semi-lattice, we do not here rely on this failure.
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That's all the metaphysics. Summary: to branching time we add a concept of agent, and a (possibly vacuous) choice set for each agent at each moment. Observe that the settledness of the past implies that if moment mo is later than moment w0, then there is exactly one possible choice for cc at w0 containing a history leading to mo. Definition: if histories from later moments mo and ml pass through the same possible choice for a at an earlier moment wo, and if mo and ml inhabit the same instant (i.e., if imo=iml), then we say that mo and ml are choice-equivalentfor a at w0: no choice that cx can make at wo can tell them apart.
We Q is true at every moment-history pair (mo, hl), where h is drawn from the same possible choice for cc at mo as is ho, and (ii) Q is not settled true at mo. In this context Q would typically be future tensed. Sometimes, when both slils are under discussion, I call the von Kutschera/Horty one the "deliberative" and the Belnap/Perloff one described in this paper the "achievement" slit, and use the notations "dslii" and "aslil" to avoid confusion. 
Paradigm stit
Question: what is a paradigm case of stit, in the guise of the approximation "the present fact that Q is guaranteed by a prior choice of a," and with the semantics suggested for this construction?
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The box in Figure 3 (which looks like and is supposed to look like a von Neumann normal form of a game) is a blowup of a single moment, wo. Assume that a and f3 are the only agents, and further assume that there are no nonvacuous choices for either a or f3 at any moment except wo (in particular, the forkings in Figure 3 The crucial point is that whereas there is a counter -(Q&R) at mo0, there is no counter to R: as already observed, at the only potential witness wo, it is already settled that R at the relevant instant imo. So what a sees to is not closed under logical consequence, and obviously so. There is not the slightest paradox in saying, nor any "funny logic" required in calculating, that from the fact that I see to it that an injured man is bandaged it does not follow that I see to it that there is an injured man, even though that an injured man is bandaged logically implies that there is an injured man. To the contrary, it is deeply built into the metaphysics of agency that such cases should be typical.
Refraining vs. not seeing to it that
Question. Are there any differences between (1) seeing to it that it is false that Q, (2) the mere absence of seeing to it that Q, and (3) refraining from seeing to it that Q, that is seeing to it that you do not see to it that Q?
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Many foolish things have been said while thinking about this question; Figure 4 vividly illustrates the differences required, and permits the essential  calculations. (This and succeeding pictures represent choices only for a, It is worth noticing that we can make this statement about M4 without even knowing whether or not Q itself holds there; all we need to observe is the failure of Q at moment M3, which is choice-equivalent to M4 at wO for a. It follows that the Positive condition for wo to witness [a stit: Q] at m4 fails in virtue of the failure of Q at m3, and since wo is the only potential witness for [a stit: Q] at m4, it must be that [a stit: Q] fails at m4, which is to say, it must be that -[a stit: Q] holds there.
(4) Moments m2 and m4 on the one hand, and m4 on the other, are quite different with respect to refraining. The picture shows that the moment w, does stand witness to a's responsibility for his or her own inaction with respect to Q at m2 or m3: not only does the right-hand choice for a at w, guarantee that a does not see to it that Q, but the left-hand choice from wl, at which a does see to it that Q, testifies that at wo a had a real choice concerning his or her seeing to it that Q. The moment m 1 stands, that is, as the "counter" required for the truth of the claim that at m2, or m3, a saw to it that he or she did not see to it that Q.
In contrast to moments m2 and m3, you can tell that in fact at moment m4, a did not actively refrain from not seeing to it that Q. The only potential witness is wo; but since a did refrain from seeing to it that Q at m2, and since m2 is choice-equivalent to m4 at wo for a, the Positive condition fails, and thereby the claim to agency. At m4 not only does a fail to see to it that Q, but he or she also fails to see to it that he or she fails to see to it that Q. At m4 you can therefore observe the difference between mere not seeing to something on the one hand, and positively refraining on the other, for, as we have calculated, at m4 there is not seeing to it without refraining. In Figure 7 , however, the witness wo for the seeing to it that P at mo is properly later than the witness wl for the seeing to it of the conditional at mo. In this case it can be at mo that one sees to it that P and sees to it that PDQ without seeing to it that Q. In particular, w1 cannot witness [a stit: Q] at mo because of the failure of Q at M2, which is choice-equivalent to mo at w1 for a. And wo cannot witness [a stit: Q] at mo, because by then the fact that Q at imois settled-there is no "counter."
The ten-minute mile Question: how is it possible to be the agent of one's own run of a ten-minute mile?
The answer is in the following picture.
[ Suppose that a has been steadily running at a ten-minute pace, and at frequent moments (of which there is no last-this is the critical condition) a has the option to drop out of the run. Consider [a stit: Q] at mo as "a sees to it that a finishes the mile in just ten minutes." Evidently [a stit: Q] should be true at mo, but it is equally evident that no single prior moment such as wo is adequate as a witness. The reason that wo cannot serve as a witness is not just intuitive, though it is that as well. In addition, the picture shows that the Positive condition is violated, for Q fails at a moment that comes out of a right-hand side of a box that is later than wo, and hence Q fails at a moment that is choice-equivalent to mo at wo for a. We therefore need to complicate our semantics (the underlying metaphysics remaining unchanged) by permitting chains as well as single moments to count as witnesses. The details are a little delicate, but you can catch the idea. It is the whole chain of choices coming right up to the finish line that stands as witness to the truth at mo of "a sees to it that a finishes the mile in just ten minutes." One has only to generalize the positive and negative conditions appropriately.19
The The proof in full is not appropriate to this sketch, but the following picture will give you the flavor. (Since this picture is part of a proof instead of an example, the "dotted line" convention is not wanted.) the chain, call it c0, must be entirely prior to mo. The Negative condition is easy: at every moment w0 in c0, Q must fail at some member of im. lying above w0. (Observe that this condition does not prevent the choice at w0 in c0 from being vacuous, for we do not say that the history on which the counter for w0 lies must split off at w0 itself.) For the Positive condition, first say that a moment ml in im. is choice-equivalent to mo at c0 for a if, for every moment w0 in c0 that lies below ml (hence below both mo and ml), ml is choice-equivalent to mo at w0 for a. Then the Positive condition is just that Q shall hold at every moment that is choice-equivalent to mo at c0 for a. Three points come after the pictures. The first is that in spite of a too sparse history, there is satisfactory internal sense to a modal logic of agency set in a context of a theory of branching time. (I take it to be obvious that since one already has branching time, one can add tense constructions as desired in the way described by Thomason.) The second point is that you ought to think about such a logic before you try to think about how agentives embed in all the philosophically important contexts that require them, for example imperatives, obligation contexts, and plans. The third point is that in fact it is important that we as philosophers take up the half of the theory of agentives neglected by the prevalent too-soon-ontological approach. We should think carefully about how it is that agentives embed in larger linguistic contexts. It is more than a pun to suggest that doing so can help us think about how it is that agents relate to their interpersonal, social, and moral contexts.
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